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MANSON V. BRATHWAITE: THE SUPREME
COURT'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
RuTH YACONA"
"'I had,' said he, 'come to an entirely erroneous conclusion which
shows, my dear Watson, how dangerous it always is to reason from
insufficient data." 1

A twenty-two-year-old woman is raped. During her ordeal,
she studies every single detail of her rapist's face. She looks at the
hairline. She looks for scars, tattoos, and for anything else that
will help her remember who this man is so she may later identify
him. When the assault is over, she knows what this man looked
like, and that she is going to make sure that he was put in jail.2
Several days later, after working with the police on a
composite sketch, she identifies who she thinks is her attacker3
Ruth received her J.D. from The John Marshall Law School
in 2006.
1. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURE OF THE SPECKLED BAND 272
(1892).

2. Michael Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process:An Appeal
for Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures,53 HASTINGS L.J.
681, 681 (2002) (citing Jennifer Thompson, Editorial, I Was Certain,But I Was
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2000, 4, at 15). Jennifer Thompson's last name
has been changed to Cannino, as of 2003. See also PBS.org, Frontline, What
Jennifer Saw, How can Eyewitness Identification Go Wrong?,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/photos/ (last visited on

Nov. 7, 2005) (displaying photos that show the facial differences of Ronald
Cotton and Bobby Poole and how Jennifer Thompson morphed the memory of
Bobby Poole into the incorrect memory of Ronald Cotton).
3. State v. Cotton, 394 S.E.2d 456, 461 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). Jennifer
originally picked two pictures from the six photos, one of which depicted
Ronald Cotton. She then examined the two photos for a number of minutes
until she told the investigating officer that Ronald Cotton's photo "looks most
like him." Id. Jennifer made a relative judgment. A relative judgment is
made when the eyewitness identifies the person in the lineup or photo array
who looks most like the perpetrator the eyewitness has in her memory, relative
to the other members in the lineup. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY,
FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 149, 157 (Alan M. Goldstein ed., 2003) (citing Wells,
G.L., The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, JOURNAL OF APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 14, 89-103 (1984)). The relative judgment process does not
present a problem when the real perpetrator is in the lineup. Id. In Jennifer's

case, if Bobby Poole, the real perpetrator had been in the first lineup, Jennifer
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after looking through a series of six photos. She identifies one
Ronald Cotton, a black male. She feels completely confident in her
decision.4 She was sure she found the man who attacked her, and
now he was going to pay.'
At a lineup, she picks the same man, Ronald Cotton, and
again feels completely confident.6 The case then goes to trial. The
victim takes the stand, and without a bit of hesitation proceeds to
tell the jury that Ronald Cotton was the man who put a knife to
her neck and raped her. Based on this primary testimony, Ronald
Cotton is sentenced to prison for life.'
A year later, the victim learns that another man in prison
claims to be her attacker. This man, Bobby Poole, is brought
before the victim. The victim is asked if she has ever seen this
man. She answers, "I have never seen him in my life. I have no
idea who he is."8
Eleven years after the first identification of Ronald Cotton,
police arrive at the victim's house and ask her to provide a blood
sample for DNA tests. She agrees, still completely confident that
the tests would come back and confirm what she already knows:
that Ronald Cotton is her rapist.9
The DNA tests come back and, to the victim's devastation,
they reveal that Ronald Cotton is not her rapist. It was Bobby
Poole."° The man who the victim thought she had never seen in
her life was the man who was inches from her throat with a knife
to her neck during those horrific moments of her life. Bobby Poole
was the man who she studied, but somehow she identified Ronald
Cotton as her assailant."
How could this happen? How could the court take away an
innocent man's liberty based upon such inaccurate identification
evidence?

might have picked him. Since Bobby Poole was not in the photos or the live
lineup, "maybe Jennifer compared the remaining members of the lineup and
chose an innocent person as the 'most like' option." JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE
WITNESS;

COPS,

COURTS,

SCIENCE,

AND

THE

BATTLE

AGAINST

MISIDENTIFICATION 71, 158 (2005).

4. See infra section II. B. 2 (describing how the officer's comments made
after Jennifer's identification greatly influenced how confident Jennifer felt
identifying Ronald Cotton, which led her to convey absolute confidence to the

jury).
5. Headley, supranote 2, at 681.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See PBS.org, supra note 2 to watch a brief video on how Jennifer

Thompson's memory of Bobby Poole's morphed into Ronald Cotton's face.
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Jennifer Thompson's and Ronald Cotton's story is not rare.12
As of January 2005, there have been 154 DNA exonerations."3
Mistaken eyewitness identification played a major part in over14
two-thirds of the first 138 post-conviction DNA exonerations.
The subsequent DNA testing in these cases proves that the
reliability test of Manson v. Brathwaite," which has been applied
in countless pre-trial suppression hearings over the past thirty
years, is inherently flawed, as it gives undue reliance to
eyewitness testimony on the mistaken assumption that it is an
accurate truth-finding tool. 6
Part I of this Comment will explain Manson v. Brathwaite
and the test the Court created to govern pre-trial eyewitness
This Comment will
identification suppression hearings.
demonstrate how the political environment greatly influenced the
Court, thereby distracting it from any real understanding of
eyewitness identification. 7 Hence, the Court created a rule of law
12. Approximately 75,000 American prosecutions turn on eyewitness
identification evidence. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 6 (citing BRIAN L. CUTLER
AND STEVEN D. PENROD, Mistaken Identification:The Eyewitness, Psychology,
and the Law (1995)). DNA exonerations prove that a tragic number of past
identifications were wrong and will continue to be wrong in the future because
the exact same procedures used to obtain the incorrect eyewitness
identifications in the past are the procedures that are still being used in many
jurisdictions today.
13. The U.S. Department of Justice, in response to the information obtained
regarding malleability of eyewitness identification, published a guide that
implemented necessary procedural changes for law enforcement officers to
follow during identification procedures. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS
available at
LAW
ENFORCEMENT,
FOR
A
GUIDE
EVIDENCE:
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
The Innocence Project: Mistaken I.D.,
14. InnocenceProject.com,
http://innocenceproject.com/causes/mistakenid.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2005).
Of the first eighty-two DNA exoneration cases studied, forty-five percent of the
mistaken eyewitness identification stemmed from photo-lineup procedures.
Id. See also U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf (last visited
on Nov. 16, 2005) (illustrating through charts that twenty-four out of the
twenty-eight DNA exoneration cases studied involved eyewitness
identification).
15. 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
16. See also Peter J. Neufeld, Have you no Sense in Decency?, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 189, 199 (1993) ("The remarkably high exclusion rates
reported by forensic DNA laboratories reveal our criminal justice system to be
more fragile and susceptible to producing wrongful convictions than many
want to believe.").
17. During Richard Nixon's presidency, vacancies in the Unites States
Supreme Court gave him the opportunity to appoint judges that had views
that were politically aligned with his. The new Nixonian majority, and
specifically Justice Blackmun in the Manson decision, did not want trial
judges second-guessing police in their investigative decision as had been done
in the days of the Warren Court. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 79. The Nixonian
majority wanted to remove the handcuffs from the police that the Warren
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that greatly underestimated the outcome determinative effect of
allowing reliable enough eyewitness identification in. 8 Part II of
this Comment argues the Manson Court did not understand how
the human memory works when it created a test that relies upon a
person's recollection. The Manson Court additionally erred when
it greatly underestimated the power that suggestive police
procedures have on obtaining a "reliable" identification. 9 Part III
concludes that courts should recognize the prejudicial, outcomedeterminative nature of the admission of unreliable eyewitness
identification evidence, and therefore apply the exclusionary rule
to suggestively obtained pre-trial eyewitness identifications in
order to ensure each defendant receives the Due Process rights
that the Constitution guarantees."0

Court had placed, but "handcuffing trial judges was another matter." Id. Now
the handcuffs would be placed on those "liberal" trial judges. Id.
18. The Court rationalized that the unreliability of evidence would be
apparent to the jurors, since eyewitness identification is a matter of common
sense. The Court did not think that incorrect identification testimony could
"fool" a juror as it might be when a coerced confession was admitted and,
therefore, no one's due process rights would be violated. The Manson Court did
not realize that jurors do not possess the knowledge to adequately determine
when an eyewitness is indeed telling the truth. This is due to the fact that
most eyewitnesses are so believable when he or she reaches the witness stand
because, in fact, it is the truth that they remember. The witness honestly, and
sincerely believes that what he/she is testifying to is the truth. A juror does
not know this, because the complexity of memory and its constant morphing
capacity are not known to the common juror. See DOYLE supra note 3, at 41
("What the 'jurors' in experiments seemed to look for from eyewitnesses was
not consistency, but confidence." (citing N. Brewer and A. Burke, Effects of
Testimonial Inconsistencies and Eyewitness Confidence on Mock-Juror
Judgments, 26 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 353 (2002)); G.L. Wells, R.C.L.

Lindsay, & T.J. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in
Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979).

19. See generally Gary L. Wells, What is wrong with the Manson v.
Brathwaite
test
of
Eyewitness
Identification
Accuracy?,
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/
Mansonproblem.pdf (last visited on Jan. 5, 2005) for a thorough analysis of
how current psychology refutes the faulty logic that the Supreme Court relied
upon at the time of the Manson decision.
20. See When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U.
CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 73-80 (1999) ("Postarrest and postconviction
DNA exonerations have invariably involved analysis of sexual assault
evidence.., that proved the existence of mistaken eyewitness identification.").
Since there does not seems to be anything inherently distinct about
identification in sexual assault cases that would make a witness more prone to
misidentification than in other crimes, "where the crucial proof is eyewitness
identification, it naturally follows that the rate of mistaken identifications and
convictions is similar to DNA exoneration cases.") Id.
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THE MANSON DEVELOPMENT

Manson v. Brathwaite2" came before the United States
Supreme Court in 1976.22 In order to understand why the Manson

Court ruled as it did, it is imperative to understand the political
climate during the 1960's and 1970's.
A. The Warren Court

Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court from 1953-1969.'
During this time, the Warren Court
"turned the Bill of Rights into a powerful weapon against
government officials -

from police officers to presidents -

who

failed to treat people fairly and equally and to respect their human
dignity."24 The Warren Court used the Bill of Rights to place more
restrictions upon the state governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process clause. This created outrage among
some in the legal community because, in the area of criminal law,
it extended Due Process from the courtroom into the police station,
and even into the streets.25 Therefore, due process of law had to be
given not only in the courtroom (i.e. judges and prosecutors), but
police outside the courtroom were also required to provide it."6
The Warren Court determined additionally that the
Fourteenth Amendment not only guaranteed certain rights, but it
also guaranteed a remedy for any infringement of those rights."
This mandatory remedy is the "exclusionary rule," 8 which holds
21. 432 U.S. 98.
22. Manson was argued before the United States Supreme Court in 1976,
but was-decided as amended in 1977. Id.
23. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE MEN
AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION

416 (1t ed. 1999).
24. Id.

25. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 71.
26. Id. at 71-72.
27. Id. at 72.
28. Id. The text of the Constitution does not specify a remedy for a victim
whose rights have been violated by a governmental actor. Up until the
twentieth century, courts allowed the victims to sue the government agents in
tort. MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES,

STATUTES, AND ExECUTIvE MATERIALS 335 (2d. ed. 2003). The Warren Court
applied the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) through the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Mapp Court
stated, "[Tihe purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.'" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). Justice Clark, in the Mapp
opinion, remarked on the idea that the exclusionary rule allows the criminal to
go free merely because of police misconduct, but rebutted, "The criminal goes
free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a
government more quickly that its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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that if evidence is obtained in violation of any rights guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause, that evidence must be excluded at
trial.' The Warren Court "recognized that certain police practices
coerced confessions were one clear example turned
subsequent trials into empty ceremonies." °
Eyewitness identification was soon placed in the same
category3' as coerced confessions because the Court realized how
much weight the jury placed upon the testimony of an eyewitness.
1.

Stovall v. Denno3

The Warren Court decided Stovall in 1967."' The issue in
Stovall was whether the defendant's Due Process rights were
violated when a police officer used a suggestive procedure to
obtain an eyewitness identification.' Stovall involved the murder
of a husband. 5 The accused had been arrested the day following
the crime and the police took him to a hospital where the wife of
the victim, who was also injured in the assault, was a patient. The
police brought the accused before the wife and she identified him
as the murderer.6
Stovall held that "a claimed violation of due process of law in
the conduct of confrontation depends on the totality of the
circumstances surrounding it." 7 The Court noted that bringing a
suspect before the victim is a "widely condemned" police procedure
because of its inherently suggestive nature.' However, because of
the exigent circumstances of that particular case (she was the only
29. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 72.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall is sometimes considered the third case in
trilogy of pre-trial identification cases. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
234 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and Stovall were all
decided the same day. However, Stovall was the first case that decided when a
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were violated when a
police officer used an impermissibly suggestive procedure. The main focus of
Wade and Gilbert was the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
33. Stovall, 388 U.S. 293.
34. Id. at 294-95.
35. Id. at 295.
36. Id. at 296.
37. Id. at 302. But see United States ex. rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d
912, 914 (2d Cir. 1970) ("Although at first sight this [Stovall] test seems fairly
simple and straightforward, it has given rise to difficult problems."). These
problems are discussed in the opinions of Judges McGowan, Leventhal and
Wright in Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (en banc, D.C. Cir. 1968).
38. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302. See The Innocence Project, supra note 14
(pointing out that show-up identifications should be avoided except in rare
circumstances where the suspect is apprehended in the immediate vicinity
and within a very short amount of time of the crime); see also Wells, supra
note 19 (emphasizing that a one-person show-up has been proven to inflate the
chances that an innocent suspect will be identified).
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one who could exonerate the accused, no one knew how long she
would live, and "the usual police station line-up ...was out of the
question"39), the Court held the admission of the identification did

not constitute a denial of Due Process.0
B. The Burger Court

Richard Nixon became president in 196841 and "turned his
guns on the Warren Court, charging it with going 'too far in
weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this
country."' 2
Conservatives criticized the Warren Court for
"handcuffing"' the police through its pro-defendant decisions.
President Nixon wanted to replace Earl Warren with a judge that
would oversee the dismantling of the Warren Court's "liberal
edifice." Warren Burger was a perfect fit for the position because
he almost always upheld criminal convictions and he publicly
denounced the Warren Court's Miranda decision.'
Harry
Blackmun, who wrote the Manson opinion, was nominated to the
Court in 1970.' He was known for always voting to uphold state
laws and siding with the government over individual rights. 4
Manson was decided in 1977. 4" The Manson case gave the
Supreme Court an opportunity to limit the reach of the Due
Process Clause that the Warren Court had stretched. It did this
by placing eyewitness identification and police procedure outside
the realm of the courts.
1.

Manson v. Brathwaite

The issue in Manson was whether the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment compelled the exclusion of "reliable"
eyewitness identification evidence when it was obtained through
unnecessary and suggestive procedures.49
In Manson, an undercover police officer, Jimmy, purchased
narcotics from the defendant." Following the sale, officer Jimmy
gave another police officer a description of the defendant." This
second officer then left a single photograph in Jimmy's office.52
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
Id. at 296.
IRONS, supra note 23 at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id. at 437.
Id.
Manson, 432 U.S. at 98.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
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Jimmy identified the person in the photograph as the defendant.
The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted for the
possession and sale of heroin.8 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari."
The Court held the admission of the
eyewitness identification did not violate the defendant's due
process rights because the unnecessarily suggestive procedure of showing only one photo to the undercover officer - did not
create a "substantial likelihood of misidentification."
In reaching its conclusion, the Manson Court had to
determine if there was a "relationship between suggestiveness and
misidentification."56
The Court, in determining that the
identification could be reliable despite unnecessarily suggestive
procedures, held that there was no relationship between the two.57
2.

The Manson "reliability"test

The Manson Court did not want trial judges second-guessing
the police. It therefore created a two-part test that was to be
followed at all pre-trial eyewitness identification suppression
hearings. This two-part test continues to govern criminal pre-trial
suppression hearings to date. 5
53. Id. at 102.
54. Manson v. Brathwaite, 527 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425
U.S. 957 (1976). The District Court of Connecticut dismissed respondent's
petition for habeas corpus. Manson, 432 U.S. at 103. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed with instructions to
issue the writ. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "evidence as to the
photograph should have been excluded, regardless of reliability, because the
examination of the single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive." Id.
55. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116, (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 384 (1968)).
56. Id. at 106.
57. Id. at 110. The Manson Court relied on Stovail to reach its decision.
The Court recognized that Stovall, a governing precedent, held that pre-trial
eyewitness identifications obtained through unnecessarily suggestive
procedures should be excluded from evidence. However, the Stovall Court
allowed the identification evidence into evidence because of the exigent
circumstances that existed in that particular case (the only eyewitness who
could rule out the suspect was a dying woman). The Stovall Court used a
"totality of the circumstances" test in order to take these exigent
circumstances into account. Id. at 113. The Manson Court, instead of taking
Stovall as a fact-specific case, applied it as a detached rule of law that was to
be applied in all following cases, despite their dramatically different facts.
The eyewitness in Manson was an undercover police officer, not a dying
woman on a hospital bed, as in Stovall. There was plenty of time for a live
lineup to be organized. The manipulation of the "totality" rule that Stovall
employed has given a very large amount of breathing room for investigating
police officers to not employ proper eyewitness identification procedures.
58. In recent years state courts continue to apply the same factors Manson
enunciated to determine the reliability of pre-trial eyewitness identification.
See, e.g., Appleton v. State, 828 So. 2d 894, 900 (Ala. 2001) (citing the Manson
totality test to determine the "constitutional adequacy" of pretrial
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The First Prong of the Test

The first prong of the Manson two-part test asks whether the
police used an unnecessarily suggestive procedure that suggests
the defendant is the perpetrator.59 If the procedure was not
suggestive, the identification evidence is allowed into evidence
because no due process obstacle is present." However, if the
procedure is suggestive, including if unnecessarily so,"' then the
Court goes on to determine if the identification is reliable despite
the suggestive quality of the procedure.
b.

The Second Prong of the Test

If the procedure is found to be suggestive, a court looks to five
factors to determine if the identification is nonetheless reliable.
These five factors are: (1) the witness's opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime,62 (2) the witness's degree of
attention during the crime,63 (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior
description of the criminal,' (4) the level of certainty that the
witness demonstrated at the confrontation,' and (5) the amount of
time between the crime and the confrontation."
The Manson decision is flawed in multiple ways.
This
Comment focuses on how the Court's ignorance to the power of

identification procedures) Id. at 900; State of Iowa v. Neal, 353 N.W.2d 83
(Iowa 1984) (placing burden on defendant to establish that suggestive
procedures were substantial enough to lead to a misidentification under the
Manson totality test).
59. Judge Martin, Decision of Interest, 230 NEW YORK L.J., July 17, 2003,
at 32.
60. See, e.g., Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that
reliability of an eyewitness identification is not a constitutionally required
finding when the procedures used were not impermissibly suggestive). This
logic admits that there is a relationship between suggestive procedures and
reliability, and this is the same logic the Manson Court refutes.
61. Turner v. State, 575 S.E.2d 727, 729 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002), provides a
clear example of how flexible and lenient courts have become in applying the
Manson "reliability" test. Turner involved an armed robbery and kidnapping
of Nazeline Jean. Id. Prior to the trial, a newspaper reporter approached Ms.
Jean and told her that one of the perpetrators was female. Further, after Ms.
Jean's identification at the lineup, the police said "correct" even though Jean
only indicated a "3" out of ten when indicating her certainty in the
identification. Id. at 730. The appellate court affirmed the trial court and
held admissible the admission of this pre-trial eyewitness identification
obtained through a suggestive photographic lineup. Id. at 730. The verbal
comment by the police officer allowed Jean to inflate her certainty and
confidence in the identification.
62. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972)).
63. Id. at 115.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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suggestive police procedures, inherent in the first prong, allows for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The second prong of the
Manson "reliability" test is also flawed and necessitates revision."
Briefly stated, the second prong's five factors are inaccurate
determinants of the reliability of eyewitness identification.' Four
out of the five factors rely on a witness's subjective assessments.'
For example, the court can only determine how much attention the
witness paid to the criminal by asking the witness herself. These
subjective assessments cannot be tested objectively and therefore
are notoriously unreliable. 0
Additionally, these subjective
assessments are easily altered due to the various stimuli that
accompany an altercation.71 Therefore, the second prong of the
Manson "reliability" test also denies a defendant due process
because it allows admission to the jury unreliable evidence that
directly bears on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

67. Id. Psychological scientists first questioned the second prong of Manson
in 1983. Wells, supra note 19 at 7. Psychologists found it problematic that
four out of the five factors of the second prong were self-report variables. Id. at
3, 7. The factors of the second prong that call for self-reports cannot be held to
indicate reliability, as Manson mistakenly held, because the eyewitness,
unintentionally, is going to exaggerate or underestimate reality based on the
circumstances. Id. at 7. In fact, the factors under the second prong lead the
fact-finder further away from the truth.
68. Wells, supra note 19 at 7.
69. Psychologists call subjective determinations "self-report variables". Id.
70. Id. (citing Nisbett, R.E. & Wilson, T.D., Telling More Than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV., 231-59 (1977),
71. For example, if an eyewitness was a victim of sexual assault and is
asked how long she viewed the assailant, studies show that she will greatly
overestimate the time because of the stress, trauma, and anxiety she suffered
resulting from the assault. Wells, supra note 16 at 7 (citing H.R. Shiffman,
Effects of stimulus complexity on the perception of brief temporal intervals, 103
J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL., 156-59 (1975)). Likewise, if an eyewitness is

asked how long she viewed the defendant without obstruction, she will
overestimate the exposure time. Wells, supra note 19 at 7. See also Brian L.
Cutler, Overview of Estimator Variables: Findings from Research on the
Effects of Witness, Crime and Perpetrator Characteristics on Eyewitness
Accuracy, (unpublished report presented at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, Reforming Eyewitness Identification: Convicting the Guilty, Protecting
the Innocent), available at http://www.naedl.org (follow "State Legislation"
hyperlink; then follow "Eyewitness Identification Procedures" hyperlink; then
follow "overview of Estimator Variables, Brian Cutler" hyperlink) (last visted
Nov. 6, 2005) (Sept. 12-13, 2004) (explaining that scientifically tested research
proves that stress has a negative effect on identification accuracy). "Across all
studies the percent of correct identifications was 39% under high stress
conditions but 59% under low stress conditions." Id. at 4.
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II. THE MANSON "RELIABILITY" TEST FAILS TO GUARANTEE DUE
PROCESS

Political philosopher John Rawls, 2 in A Theory of Justice,"
characterized due process as "a process reasonably designed to
ascertain the truth."4 Due process ensures that a criminal trial
will result in the "reliable determination of [the] guilt or
innocence" of a defendant."5
The admission of eyewitness
identification evidence bears directly on this determination. When
a court neglects to prevent the admission of unreliable and
prejudicial evidence, it fails to guarantee a fair trial.
The Manson Court did not perceive suggestive police
procedures as a threat to the reliability of the human memory.
The Manson Court erroneously assumed that the human memory
was a dependable truth-finding tool, accurate enough to withstand
even the most suggestive police procedures. The Manson Court
created a test that failed to guarantee due process because it
allows a defendant to be convicted on unreliable, and therefore
unconstitutional, evidence.
A.

The Inaccuracyof Human Memory

The Manson Court created the "reliability" test based on the
assumption that memories are preserved intact,7 and that the

72. John Rawls was one of the most important political philosophers of the
twentieth century. He challenged utilitarian philosophy and developed
principles of justice for a liberal society. A directory of John Rawls's
contributions
to
American
philosophy
can
be
found
at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/original-position/#RP (last visited Nov. 16,
2005).
73. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

74. Headley, supra note 2, at 694 (citing RAWLS, supra note 73 at 239).
75. John W. Berry, et al., Outside Counsel; Civil-Arranged Suggestive
Identifications, 231 NEW YORK L.J., Mar. 17, 2004, at 4 (citing People v.
Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 251 (1981)).
76. The Manson court held that an identification may be excluded if the
suggestive police procedure was so egregious as to cause "a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 (quoting
Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384). This logic necessarily assumes that the human
memory is a dependable truth-finding tool. The Court also states that the
suggestive procedure must cause an "irreparable misidentification". Id. The
Court did not understand that even the slightest suggestive procedure, such as
the comment the investigating officer made in Jennifer Thompson's case, can
make the original memory "irreparable," and lost forever because of its
inherent malleability. See Wells, supra note 19 at 6 (citing Bradfield, S.L., et
al., The damaging effect on confirming feedback on the relation between
eyewitness certainty and identification accuracy, 87 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL.
112-20 (2002)) (illustrating through a series of experiments that when a group
of witnesses are given post-identification feedback (e.g. "Good, you identified
the suspect"), the witness became highly certain about their identifications
and recalled being certain all along).
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human mind is a "precise recorder and storer of events."7
Although this view is far from correct, many individuals within
the criminal justice system still believe it to be true."8
Other individuals question such a belief. Dr. Elizabeth
Loftus," a renowned scientist in the area of eyewitness
identification, analogizes the memory-storing function of our brain
to drawers, both crammed with many different items. These
drawers:
are constantly being emptied out, scattered about, and then stuffed
back into place... As new bits and pieces of information are added
into long-term memory, the old memories are removed, replaced,
crumbled up, or shoved into corners. Little details are added,
confusing or extraneous elements are deleted, and a coherent
construction of the facts is gradually created that may bear little
resemblance to the original event.8
Thus, memories are constantly being changed and
reconstructed, rather than being fixed and immutable.81 Our
memories are not objective recorders of facts that can be
questioned for truth.82
Once memorized, what once was an
original event becomes a subjective reality.' The human mind,
and its memory forming function, has enormous power - power
"even to make us believe in something that never happened."
In it's holding, the Manson Court relied upon and affirmed
Neil v. Biggers.' The Biggers Court allowed into evidence an
eyewitness identification that was obtained at a lineup that
occurred seven months after the crime.' In doing so, the Court

77. Elizabeth Loftus, et al., Magic of the Mind from Witness for the Defense,
in WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUSED, THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE
EXPERT
WHO
PUTS
MEMORY
ON
TRIAL
(1991), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/photos/eye/text_06.html

(last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
78. Id.

79. Dr. Elizabeth Loftus has been a public figure for thirty years and has
been on Oprah, Larry King, and Court TV for her findings in the area of
eyewitness identification. DOYLE, supra note 3 at 85-86. James Doyle wrote
an excellent biography on Elizabeth Loftus as a person and how her findings
have successfully forced some in the legal field to recognize the inherent flaws
of the human memory. Id., at 83-99.
80. Loftus, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Robert J. Hallisey, Experts on Eyewitness Testimony in Court - A
Short Historical Perspective, 39 HOw. L.J. 237, 243 (1995) (stating that
"individual experience is not recorded on a clean slate[;]" rather, it is

interpreted against the back-round of the observer's experiences, prejudices,
and preconceptions).
84. Loftus, supra note 77.
85. Manson, 432 U.S. at 99-117.

86. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 101-102.
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placed an enormous amount of misplaced faith in the long-lasting
and unchanging memory of the eyewitness.
At the time Manson was decided, there was ample research
explaining the flaws of eyewitness identification.87 Much of the
research directly related to the five factors the Manson decision
instituted and how these factors are not determinants of
accuracy.' Justice Blackmun, however, in forming the Manson
opinion, refused to consider this research' and created a test for
the admission of eyewitness identification evidence that lacked
necessary constitutional safeguards.'

87. Felice Levine and June Tapp are two social scientists with the
American Bar Foundation that published a law review article investigating
eyewitness reliability. F. Levine & J. Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal
Identification: the Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1579 1579
(1973). This article was published in 1973, four years before Manson was
decided. It shows how far psychology had come in the area of eyewitness
identification since Munsterburg's time. However, besides a solitary citation
in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, there is nothing to show that any of
the Justices deciding the Manson case took any time or energy to address this
research. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 79.
88. Before Manson was decided, there was ample research that refuted the
logic the Court relied upon in creating the five-factor test. DOYLE, supra note
3, at 80. For example, Munsterberg, a leading scientist in the area of
eyewitness identification, had warned that the confidence of a witness in his
or her own identification was not an indicator that the witness was accurate.
Id. However, Justice Blackmun disregarded this knowledge and "enshrined a
witness's confidence" as one of the factors that a court must consider in
determining the reliability of the identification. Id. at 107. By 2001, Saul
Kassin, a leading scientist in the area of eyewitness identification, and ninetyseven percent of all experts in this area agreed that a solid body of empirical
research justified distrust of witness confidence. Id. at 107.
89. See id. at 80 (explaining how every one of the factors instituted in the
Manson decision is an aspect of eyewitness memory that psychologists had
researched). However, "Blackmun would have no part of them. The Supreme
Court continued its embargo of psychological knowledge". Id. at 79.
90. See Winn S. Collins, Improving Eyewitness Evidence Collection
Procedures in Wisconsin, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 529, 551 (2003) ("The Court could
have used more accurate predictors of accuracy had the Justices reviewed the
expansive history of social science literature on the subject, rather than
relying solely upon their own logic."). Collins emphasized Blackmun's error by
quoting Justice Holmes in his opinion in N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, (1921). Holmes stressed that "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic." Eisner,256 U.S. at 349.
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B. The Power of Subtle Suggestion9"
The Manson Court erred when it assumed that the use of
police officers' suggestive pre-identification procedures do not
directly affect the reliability of an eyewitness's identification.
Jennifer Thompson's story provides a clear example of how easily
the memory of an individual changes with the slightest
Jennifer described the step-by-step process of the
suggestion.'
identification procedure to an interviewer at the Public
Jennifer described the
Broadcasting Station ("PBS")."
identification as follows:
After I picked (out the photograph) they looked at me and said, 'We
thought this might be the one,' because he had a prior conviction...
When I picked him out of the physical lineup and I walked out of the
room, they looked at me and said, 'That's the same guy', I mean,
'That's the one you picked out in the photo.' For me that was a huge
amount of relief, not that I'd picked the photo, but that I was sure
when I looked at the photo, that was him, and when I looked at the
physical lineup, I was sure it was him.
The police who obtained Jennifer's identification of Ronald
Cotton were not intentionally94 trying to convict an innocent man.
They were merely trying to obtain evidence and did not realize
that their words or suggestions95 permanently destroyed the
identification evidence due to the malleability of Jennifer's
96
memory.
91. See Wells, supra note 3 at 8 (citing D.J. Deckle, et al., Children as
Witnesses: A Comparison of Lineup Versus Showup Identifaction Methods, 10
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1-12 (1996); Gonzales, et al., Misidentifications
and Failures to Identify in Lineups and Showups, J.PERSONALITY AND SOC.
PSYCHOL. (1994); and R. Lindsay, et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential
Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and
Children, 21 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 391, 391-404 (1997)) (explaining that

the courts have not clearly defined when a procedure is suggestive).
92. See Gary Wells, Eyewitness Identification:Psychological Research and
Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 771 (1995) (stating

that witnesses are easily influenced to suggestive cues and comments before
and after the lineup).
93. PBS.org, supra note 2 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
94. There is documented scientific literature that shows how questioners,
without awareness, can affect the answers received because of their own
knowledge of the subject and their own desire to establish a case. See Gary L.
Wells, et al., Effects of PostidentificationFeedback on Eyewitness Identification
and NonidentificationConfidence, 89 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 336 (2004)

(discussing the process of identification from live lineup to trial, and the
artificial confidence of the eyewitness that suggestive police procedures
create).
95. See id. (explaining that when given confirming or disconfirming
feedback after the identification, eyewitnesses are likely to adjust their
confidence level to reflect whether they were accurate or inaccurate in the
identification).
96. Id.
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The Manson Court, like the investigating officer in Jennifer's
case, did not realize the danger suggestive procedures present to
the preservation of reliable identification evidence. When a victim
makes an identification and the investigating police officer
confirms it, the victim becomes more certain than before and goes
into court exuding that confidence, making the identification more
believable to the jury despite its falsity.97 This dangerous process,
which the Manson Court failed to consider, directly contaminates
the truth-finding process that any reading of the Due Process
Clause demands.98
1.

The Emotional State of the Eyewitness

The Manson court failed to consider the increased
susceptibility of an eyewitness to suggestive procedures when that
eyewitness was the victim of, or witness to, a traumatic crime.9
When an eyewitness goes into a lineup or looks at a set of photos,
the eyewitness naturally thinks that the police have done their
job, and that they are presenting to him or her the right suspect."°
This inherent suggestiveness accompanies all police identification
procedures.
However, when an eyewitness has an emotional stake in the
identification because they have been raped or been victim to some
other traumatic crime, there is an extra incentive to see the crime
solved, if only to bring closure and allow him or her move on with
their life as soon as possible.'
If the investigating officer, who
also wants the crime solved, communicates to the eyewitness an
idea of who the suspect is, 0 2 the victim may be more susceptible to
97. PBS.org, supra note 2 (last visited Nov. 22, 2005).
98. The Court failed to recognize that the first suggestive procedure used
corrupts four of the five Manson factors that the Court believed to have
immunity from corruption. Collins, supra note 90, at 551 (citing Gary L. Wells
& Amy Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
360, 374 (1998)).
99. The five factors of Manson's second prong do not consider the nature of
the crime itself in determining the possible reliability of the eyewitness
identification. See text sec. I.B.l.b. for the five factors enunciated in Manson.
100. PBS.org, supra note 2.
101. Edwin M. Borchard, a legal scholar in the area of mistaken eyewitness
identification, analyzed sixty-five cases of wrongful convictions and concluded
that twenty-nine of the cases (approximately forty-five percent) were the
result of mistaken eyewitness identifications. Loftus, supra note 77, (citing
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 367 (1932)). Further, Borchard concluded that
these erroneous convictions illustrate how "the emotional balance of the victim
or eyewitness is so disturbed by his extraordinary experience that his powers
of perception become distorted and his identification is frequently most
untrustworthy." Id.
102. This unconscious transference of knowledge on the part of the
investigating officer is one reason that many in the psychology and legal field
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internalizing that information because of his or her emotional
state. °3
Consider the following story: In 1970, twenty-one-year-old
Bobby Joe Leaster was conversing with friends on a street
Suddenly, two policeman jumped out of their car, guns
corner.'
drawn, and accused Bobby of murdering a local store owner.
Bobby was then arrested, put in the back of the squad car, and
The murdered man's wife was
brought to a nearby hospital.'
brought to the police car to peer through the window at the
arrested suspect.'° The officer asked, "What do you think?" The
woman began to cry and said, "Yes, this looks like the man who
I see the mark on this eye." 107 Based solely
shot my husband ....
on this identification, Bobby was sentenced to life without
parole. 108
Sixteen years later, through the hard work of two persistent
attorneys, Bobby Joe Leaster was declared innocent after ballistics
tests showed that the bullet taken from the murder victim
matched a gun used in another crime that occurred two weeks
after Bobby Joe was placed in custody.19
The police officers performed a one-person showup 0° when
are now advocating "double blind" lineups.
103. PBS.org, supra note 2.
104. Loftus, supra note 77, at 6.
105. Commonwealth v. Leaster, 479 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Mass. 1985).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Loftus, supra note 77; see also Leaster, 479 N.E.2d at 128-29 (citing
Commonwealth v. Moon, 405 N.E.2d 947, 951-52 (Mass. 1980)) (finding that
the due process rights of the defendant were not violated when the police
showed defendant to the victim's wife in a one-on-one showup; further, the
identification would be denied admission only if a desire was shown on the
part of the police to "stack the deck" against the defendant).
109. Charles Kenney, Justice for Bobby Joe, THE BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Feb.
28, 1988, available at http://www.nodp.orglma/stacks/bleaster.html (last
visitedNov. 22, 2005).
110. On page 27, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, defines a "showup"
as a "prompt display of a single suspect to a witness." See Loftus, supra note
77 (explaining that showups are dangerously suggestive because the
procedure tells the witness, without giving him or her the opportunity to view
anyone else (and therefore not test any memory) that the person the police
presented is believed to be guilty). The suggestion of guilt can be no stronger
than when a suspect is viewed arrested in the back of an officer's car. This
problem also presents itself in live lineups where individuals that do not at all
resemble the description of the suspect surround the suspect, who matches the
description the witness gave the investigating officer.. A "foil" is a person
known to be innocent who is put into the lineup with the suspect to test the
memory of the witness. If the foils do not match the description of the suspect,
there is no test of the witness's memory because only one person will in fact
match the memory of the assailant. Gary L. Wells, et al., Once the Selection of
Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 835, 844
(demonstrating the disparities in physical attributes between the suspect and
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they brought the victim's wife to the police car to witness only
Bobby."' This dangerously suggestive procedure, coupled with the
emotional state of the eyewitness, created in that eyewitness an
inaccurate memory that resulted in the conviction of an innocent
man, costing him sixteen years of his life.
In Commonwealth v. Leaster,"' the presiding judge
emphasized that the eyewitness had viewed the assailant for three
minutes while he held her at gunpoint"3 and that the
identification occurred within an hour of the crime."'
The degree of attention that a witness pays to the assailant
and the period of time between the crime and the confrontation
are two factors that the Manson Court encouraged lower courts to
look to in determining the reliability of a pre-trial eyewitness
identification. Yet it also mandated that lower courts ignore any
suggestive police procedures used in obtaining the identification" 5
on the theory that eyewitness identification procedures are best
left in the hands of the police."' This was the exact rationale the
Massachusetts Supreme Court followed when it overlooked the
showup procedure used in Bobby's case and allowed the pre-trial
eyewitness identification into evidence.

III. DUE PROCESS DEMANDS EXCLUSION
As of February 5, 2005, 155 people have been exonerated by
DNA." 7 These cases provide the tools to determine with certainty
the fillers through lineup pictures obtained from police records).
111. The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Alabama
have both discussed the inherent unreliability of one-person showups. Wade,
388 U.S. at 234; Appleton, 828 So. 2d at 899-900.
112. 479 N.E.2d 124.
113. Id. at 126.
114. Id. at 125.
115. Rather than deterring show-ups and the showing of single photographs,
"the effect of Biggers and Manson has been to provide the police with a fairly
clear signal that absent extremely aggravating circumstances, the one-on-one
presentation of suspects to witnesses will result in no suppression." Steven
Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Process Test
Fails to meet Its Own Criteria,11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 60 (1981). The "totality
of circumstances" test, "which places a premium on the probable guilt of the
accused, will not serve as a deterrent to police use of suggestive procedures
but will have the opposite result." Wallace Sherwood, The Erosion of
Constitutional Safeguards in the Area of Eyewitness Identification, 30 HOW.
L.J.439, 478 (1987).
116. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 79-80 (discussing how Justice Blackmun
laid out the five factor test in Manson to deter judges from second guessing
police procedures, as was done during the Warren Court era). After Manson
was decided, the courts could deter unlawful searches and seizures by
excluding evidence obtained from them, but could not do anything to prevent
unnecessarily suggestive procedures from going to the jury. Id.
117. Innocence Project, supra note 14.
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what factors or events in the investigatory and charging process
1
created incorrect results."
Eighty percent of the first onehundred convictions that DNA technology proved wrongful were
based on, to an important extent, sincere and confident, but
mistaken, witnesses."9
These facts prove that the Manson
"reliability" test is deeply flawed, and that these wrongfully
convicted individuals were not tried with due process.
The Manson Court held that the exclusionary rule is not a
constitutional predicate because "a suggestive preindictment
identification procedure does not in itself intrude upon a
constitutionally protected interest."2 0 However, the suggestive
preindictment identification procedure that the investigating
officer used in Jennifer Thompson's case intruded upon Ronald
Cotton's constitutionally protected interest.
Likewise, the
suggestive preindictment identification procedure that the
investigating officers used in Bobby Joe Leaster's case intruded
upon his constitutionally protected interest. And these are only
two highly publicized cases."'
When the Manson Court held that the exclusionary rule "goes
too far"12 in guarding against the risks of misidentification, it
ignored the threat to the truth-seeking process that the following
fact presents: that juries are unduly receptive to eyewitness
118. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at III.
119. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000); see Margery Malkin
Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't-Unless It also Curbs
Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 272 (2002) ("The
most frequently cited cause for miscarriages of justice is eyewitness
misidentification."); Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in
Capital Cases, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 136 (1998) ("Eyewitness
misidentification is by far the most common cause of convictions of innocent
defendants.").
120. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.13.
121. See PBS.org, supra note 2 (stating that there is "no question... that the
number of innocent people who've been unjustly convicted probably runs into
the thousands.") This estimation comes from the recent FBI results on DNA
exclusions. Id. When thinking about the suggestive police procedures used
when obtaining eyewitness identifications, it is important to remember that
the supervising officers that taught the current police officers how to conduct
lineups are the same police officers that conducted the suggestive lineups or
photo arrays that led to wrongful convictions. Ken Patenaude, Improving
eyewitness identification, LAW ENFORCEMENT TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 2003, 178,
availableat http://www.officer.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2004). Peter Neufeld,
in his remarks at the Innocence Project conference stated, "If Detective Smith
conducted an unduly suggestive procedure in Case One, which resulted in a
post-conviction DNA exoneration, there is an excellent chance that, that was
part of his practice, and that he may have done it in other cases as well."
Peter J. Neufeld, Remarks at the Innocence Project & Benjamin Cardozo Law
School Symposium on Reforming Eyewitness Identification (September 10-11,
2004); For a commentary on Neufeld's remarks see TARYN SIMON, THE
INNOCENTS (1975).
122. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112.
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expressed

A. The Due Process Clause
It is not the job of the court to control police procedures. Our
constitutionally-based checks and balances system does this. But
it is the job of the court to safeguard constitutional rights. Due
Process rights, given to all citizens under the Fourteenth
Due process
Amendment, require the court's protection.
a
fair
trial.
minimum,
at
a
guarantees,
A trial is not fair when it is no longer adversarial, but only an
empty ceremony void of meaningful process. The fairness of a trial
vanishes when a prejudicial piece of evidence is admitted to the
jury and the jury places gives weight to such evidence. For
example, the jury is not going to question the validity of a
confession that the defendant signed. The jury will recognize the
confession as admittance of guilt, and the case will be closed. The
same process occurs when the jury listens to the testimony of a
sincere and honest (although mistaken) eyewitness about his or
her identification of the defendant.
B. The Jury
"Aside from a smoking pistol, nothing carries as much weight
with a jury as the testimony of an actual witness." 25 The jury in
the Cotton / Thompson case knew that Jennifer had poor eyesight
and that she had not been wearing her glasses at any time during
They also knew that Cotton's blood type did not
the assault.'
match the semen stains and that Jennifer's first photo
identification was given in a tentative manner.'27 Yet they still
placed implicit faith in Jennifer's in-court testimony.
The Manson Court was "content to rely upon the good sense
and judgment of American juries ... Juries are not so susceptible
that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification
This
testimony that has some questionable feature."'28
contentment with a jury's truth-finding capabilities led the
Manson Court to create a test that has allowed numerous

123. Id. at 119-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting), (citing P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19-23 (1965); N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, §§ 3.01, 3.02, 30 (1972),

and H.A. Hammelmann & Glenville Williams, Identification Parades-H,CRIM.
L. REV. 545, 550 (1963).
124. PBS.org, supra note 2.
125. Loftus, supra note 77.
126. DOYLE, supranote 3, at 42.
127. Id.
128. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.
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unreliable and incorrect eyewitness identifications into evidence
for the susceptible jury to rely on.
The Manson Court held that identification testimony is only
evidence, and "is not a factor that goes to the very heart ... of the
adversary process."" 9 However, because of the weight a jury
places upon a confident eyewitness's testimony, the identification
testimony is an outcome-determinative piece of evidence. The
Manson test did not consider the impact that unreliable
identification testimony would have on the truth-finding process,
as well as society as a whole. 3 1 When a juror listens to a victim
testify that, "I was there, I saw it, that's the guy, I'll never forget
the face, I'm absolutely positive," it is very hard to weaken the
juror's belief in the accuracy of that testimony. Cross-examination
cannot weaken it because by the time the witness is on the stand,
they have told their story multiple times and, most importantly,
from a subjective standpoint they are being completely honest.3
When the admission of particular evidence would be so
prejudicial to a defendant as to deprive the defendant of a fair
The Manson Court
trial, that evidence should be excluded.
effectively deemed the improper admission of eyewitness
identification testimony as harmless error and perceived the risk
of unnecessary exclusion of evidence as being greater than the risk

129. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113.
130. Consider the "Ford Heights Four" case. Thomas P. Sullivan, Close
Encounters of the first kind: A first-hand look at wrongful convictions, how
they occur, and what they cost, 87 JUDICATURE 166, 167 (2004). The case
involved a murder of a young man and woman in a suburb of Chicago, Illinois.
Id. Four young men were arrested based on the testimony of an eyewitness.
The four young men were prosecuted for rape and murder. Two of the four
were sentenced to death. The appeal process ended after fifteen or sixteen
years. Id. A law student, assigned to due some investigative work on the
case, discovered a police report that named four other men as the murderers.
This report, which had been buried in police reports, led to the exoneration of
the four men and a civil law suit that settled for more than thirty million
dollars. Id.
131. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 (citing Clemons v. United States, 133 U.S.
App. D.C. 27, 48, to argue that unreliable eyewitness testimony can be
demonstrated to the trier of fact through the adversary process and is
therefore not fatal to a fair trial. "Counsel can both cross-examine the
identification witnesses and argue in summation as to factors causing doubts
as to the accuracy of the identification. .. ." Id; see United States v. Downing,
753 F.2d 1224, 1230 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) (arguing that "to the extent that a
mistaken witness may retain great confidence in an inaccurate identification,
cross-examination can hardly be seen as an effective way to reveal the
weakness in [that] witness's recollection of [the] event").
But see John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of CrossRacial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRiM. L. 207, 210 (2001) (explaining how,
despite cross-examination that casts doubt on the accuracy on the
identification, empirical data indicates that jurors "tend to place great weight
on eyewitness identifications and often ignore exculpatory evidence").
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of misidentification. 132 However, jurors' disproportionate reliance
on eyewitness testimony refutes such assumed harmlessness, and
the number of cases of misidentified defendants casts doubt on
such an evaluation of relative risks.
The proposed exclusionary rule for suggestively obtained
eyewitness identifications does not focus on deterrence of improper
police procedure, although the exclusionary rule would inevitably
deter many improper police procedures that take place in many
jurisdictions. 13 The exclusionary rule focuses on and advocates
the return of due process to the criminal justice system in the area
of eyewitness identification. "A defendant's right to due process
would be only theoretical if it did not encompass the need to
establish rules to accomplish that end."" ' Until the legal system
accepts and incorporates the science"' and scientific research

132. The Manson Court feared the repercussions of allowing a guilty person
to go free. Manson, 432 U.S. at 110. However, it fails to remember that there
is a very strong institutional bias that says "I might have to let some go if that
means I'm not going to put an innocent person in prison." David Angel,
Remarks at the Innocence Project & Benjamin Cardozo Law School
Symposium on Reforming Eyewitness Identification (September 10-11,
2004).Additionally, the Manson Court failed to realize that eyewitness
testimony should always be circumstantial evidence, and never the sole factor
for conviction. Gary Wells stated, "Remember that identification is only one
element to your case. If you don't get him on identification, it doesn't mean
that he is walking, but it just means you don't have that." Gary Wells,
Remarks at the Innocence Project & Benjamin Cardozo Law School
Symposium on Reforming Eyewitness Identification (September 10-11, 2004).
Accordingly, if the eyewitness testimony is not admitted, it should not be
cause for reversal, or "Dranconian sanction" because the jury or the trier of
fact should not allow the eyewitness testimony to be the determining factor in
deciding the outcome of the trial. A conviction should very sparingly be based
on one element, and even more so when that one element is the eyewitness
identification because of inherent unreliability proved by research and DNA.
133. The Manson Court let judges "off the hook" by mandating the
employment of the almost mechanical two-part test to follow in pre-trial
suppression hearings. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 80. But the Court also let
police officers off the hook. The Manson decision "provided no motivation for
reexamining or reshaping everyday routines," because of there was only an
improbable chance that the eyewitness identification would not be admitted
under the lenient Manson standard. Id. "[F]rom the police prospective
suffering judicial punishment after Manson seemed as likely as being struck
my lightening." Id.
134. People v. Adams, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383 (N.Y. 1981).
135. The most common reason judges give when they refuse to admit expert
testimony is that eyewitness memory is a matter of common sense, and jurors
will apply their own common sense to the case. However, science tells us that
jurors do indeed rely on their commonsense when they decide cases, but their
common sense is simply wrong. DOYLE, supra note 3, at 42. See Cutler, et al.,
Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR, 185 (1990) (demonstrating the lack of accurate knowledge on the
part of jurors regarding certain variables that can greatly effect the memory of
an eyewitness); PBS.org, supra note 2 (explaining that jurors place an
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developed in the area of eyewitness identification, per se exclusion
is the only road that will ensure the enforcement of the Due

Process Clause in our courts.

136

CONCLUSION

"When innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned,
especially to die, then, the subject will exclaim, 'Whether I behave
well or ill is of no account; for virtue itself is no security.' And if
such an idea as that takes hold in the mind of the subject, that
would be the end of all security whatsoever." 37
There are police departments throughout the nation that are
making major changes based upon the psychological studies and
information regarding memory and suggestibility in police
procedures.
These police departments are actively trying to
prevent misidentifications before they occur. However, there are
still approximately 12,500 jurisdictions that still follow the same
police procedures that were used in Ronald Cotton's and Bobby Joe
Leaster's cases."'
This shows that eyewitness identification
reform is just beginning, with much still left to be done. This is
where the court comes in. Criminal courts in the United States
have an enormous responsibility to the citizens of America. In
order for this justice to be more than theoretical, the court must
enforce procedures that guarantee that the guilty go to jail and the
innocent go free. Currently, the system is not working properly
because it is not protecting a citizen's most precious right: the
right to due process.
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience."" 9 Courts have continually dismissed psychological
research because the research did not provide them with any

enormous amount of faith in the memory of an eyewitness because they
believe their memories are in fact reliable and unmalleable).
136. See James M. Doyle, Two Stories of Eyewitness Error,27 CHAMPION 24

(2003) (stating that one reason trial judges are wary of expert testimony is
because the experts are incapable of determining whether the particular

witness on trial is wrong or right). Additionally, judges are worried that the
eyewitness experts will raise doubt about all eyewitnesses, taking down the
truly reliable witnesses with those that are unreliable. Id.
137. DOYLE, supra note 3 at 203, (citing Rex v. Wemms, in L. WROTH, 3
Legal Papers of John Adams 242 (1965)). Justice Brandeis articulated a
similar sentiment when he stated: "Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example.... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for

law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): (J. Brandeis, dissenting).
138. DOYLE, supra note 3 at 204.

139. Id. at 6, (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881)).0
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concrete, experienced-based proof.4 ' Eyewitness testimony is the
court's oldest form of proof. But if it is experience that will finally
push the courts to change, the DNA exonerations provide that
experience. The Court must become part of the needed reform in
the area of eyewitness identification, and bring back the
fundamental security to the criminal justice system: due process.

140. See DOYLE, supra note 3, at 24 (stating that one reason trial judges are
wary of expert testimony is because the experts are incapable of determining
whether the particular witness on trial is wrong or right). Additionally, judges
are worried that the eyewitness experts will raise doubt about all
eyewitnesses, taking down the truly reliable witnesses with those that are
unreliable. Id.

